



Errata

NFPA 72®

National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code

2019 Edition

Reference: Table A.18.4.4, A.24.12 and A.24.12.2

Errata No: 72-19-1

The Technical Committee on Emergency Communication Systems, and the Correlating Committee on Signaling Systems for the Protection of Life and Property note the following errors in the 2019 edition of *NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code*.

1. In the row “Mechanical rooms” in Table A.18.4.4, revise to read as follows:

Table A.18.4.4 Average Ambient Sound Level According to Location

Location	Average Ambient Sound Level (dBA)
Business occupancies	54
Educational occupancies	45
Industrial occupancies	88
Institutional occupancies	50
Mercantile occupancies	40
Mechanical rooms	89 91
Piers and water-surrounded structures	40
...	

2. Restore annex material for A.24.12 and A.24.12.2 (formerly A.24.14 and A.24.14.2 in 2016 edition of *NFPA 72*) that was inadvertently deleted to read as follows:

A.24.12 The risk analysis forms the basis for the emergency response plan.

Ensuring accurate information dissemination to the right people, at the right place, and at the right time is essential to the mitigation of threat actions and consequences. Trained personnel are charged with making such decisions in real time. Quite often, the instructions provided to personnel in affected areas pertain to acting in specific defensive ways so as not to expose them to danger. A typical example is the case of a chemical or biological agent attack wherein the right response is to relocate to secure areas within the building while sealing doors and windows and shutting down air intakes, rather than to leave the building and be exposed to the attacking agent.

In cases of bomb threats, where specific information is available, directions for evacuation are to be given; these directions require more specificity than simply the instruction “Evacuate the building.” In

most cases, the evacuation route might depend on threat intelligence and is likely to be different from that specified in an emergency response plan. Most people can tell where the fire comes from but do not always know where the bomb is. Automatic evacuation of a building, a common procedure in cases of a fire, is to be avoided, since it might expose personnel to even greater danger.

One of the reasons for implementing a mass notification system is the threat of terrorism. Terrorism attacks tend to be well organized and are often planned with details to inflict the widest degree of damage that is possible. The mass notification system must be designed to withstand various attack scenarios and survive even if some damage has already occurred.

Each design of a mass notification system should be specific to the nature and anticipated risks of each facility for which it is designed. Although this chapter outlines some specific criteria and/or limitations, each design should be based on recognized performance-based design practices.

The mass notification system should take into account various considerations, such as those indicated in this chapter. The particular design might or might not incorporate these provisions.

Considerations for developing a mass notification system are as follows:

- (1) Specific design for the facility
- (2) Account for anticipated risks
- (3) Use of live and/or prerecorded messaging
- (4) Interfacing with other building emergency communications systems
- (5) Interfacing with wide-area notification systems
- (6) Ability to control the HVAC and access control systems
- (7) Access to system components
- (8) Survivability of the system
- (9) Communication link redundancy and security
- (10) Redundancy and security of the emergency command center
- (11) Ability to customize and add to prerecorded message library
- (12) Messages should be tailored to the situation and audience
- (13) Scripted messages for live voice messages
- (14) Proper training of individuals that operate the system

A.24.12.2 The design professional(s) as part of the design team should be experienced in multiple areas considered essential for conducting the risk analysis and performance design based on the scope and size of the project. Areas of experience can include, but are not limited to, the following:

- (1) Applying recognized performance-based design concepts
- (2) Conducting hazard and operability studies
- (3) Technical aspects of fire alarm system design
- (4) Technical aspects of emergency communication systems
- (5) Security risks and/or terrorist threats
- (6) Building code requirements and limitations with respect to egress
- (7) Human response to emergency conditions
- (8) Development of emergency response plans
- (9) Other qualifications relative to the needs of the user/risk

The design professional(s) will often be a part of the engineering design team preparing project documents and specifications. However, the design professional can work for or be obtained by a qualified installation company. The design professional should be bound by professional licensing guidelines to ensure that the risk analysis is conducted in an objective manner based on user needs and not based on product or employment.

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(Note: Electronic products and pamphlet reprints may have this errata incorporated. For current information about the NFPA Codes and Standards, including this errata, please see www.nfpa.org/docinfo)